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[Crim. No. 10818. In Bank.

Nov. 27, 1968.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD
WAYNE WHITE, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Witnesses-Self -crimination-Defendants in Criminal Proceedings-Identification of Accused.-In a flrst degree murder
prosecution, a sheriff's officer's testimony that at the sheriff's
station defendant consented to try on a coat found nt the
scene of the homicide and that the coat appeared to fit him
was properly admitted; the privilege against self-incrimination, with its attendant requirements of the warnings prescribed by Miranda docs not apply to the furnishing of that
kind of physical evidence.
[2] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-"Critical
Stage" of Prpceeding.-Defendant's trying on of a coat found
at the scene' of a homicide at the suggestion of a slleriff's
officer at the sheriff's station was not a "critical stage" of
the proceedings when absence of counsel could derogate from
the fairness of defendant's ensuing first degree murder trial.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 179; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 367
et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 349 et seq.
14cK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 23; [2,9] Criminal Law,
§l07(1); [3] Homicide, § 145(3); [4] Criminal Law, § 524(5); [5]
Criminal Law, § 107(12); [6] Criminal Law, § 325; [7] Criminal
Law, § 443(3); [8] Criminal Law, § 448(4); [10] Criminal Law,
§ 1011 (4); [11, 12] Criminal Law, § 1011 (3); [13] Criminal Law,
§ 1440(3).
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[3] Bomicide-Evidence-Sufficiency of Evidence of First Degree
Murder.-In a prosecution for first degree murder committed
in the perpetration of burglary, robbery and rape, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's detennination of
first degree lIlurder where defendant's coat was found on a
chair in a bar, the scene of the homicide; where a .22 caliber
shell casing was found on the floor of the bar, and the fatal
bullet was fired from a .22 pistol, admittedly belonging to
defendant; where, although the victim's genital area was not
injured, a test for sperm was inconclusive because she was
menstruating; and where evidence showed a significant correspondence between the amount of money defendant had in
his possession and the amount taken from the bar.
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Photographs--To Prove Position
and Condition of Body.-In a first degree murder prosecution,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a
photograph of the deceased in evidence, where the photograph
was a black-and-white depiction of the victim as she was
found, on the morning after the shooting, in a bar which the
victim, a waitress at the bar, had the responsibility of closing
the night before.
,
[6] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Adequacy of Defense.-In a first degree llIurder prosecution, defend lint was
not denied a fair trial because two attorneys represented the
People in the courtroom while defendant was represented by
only one deputy public defender, where the initial decision 011
the number of attorneys assigned to the defense was properly
the public defender's, where had the deputy defender felt
inadequate to try the case he could have requested additional
assistance from the public defender's office or explained his
difficulties to the trial judge and asked for appointment of an
associate, where nothing in the record indicated that the task
of defendant's lawyer was in any way increased by the presence of more than one prosecuting attorney, and where the
court could not assure "equal" representation on both sides
by requiring numerical equality of counsel.
[6] ld.-Course and Conduct of Trial-Power and Conduct of
Judge.-In a first degree llIurder prosecution, the trial judge's
participation in the proeeedings was even-handed, and the
issue of guilt was tried fairl~' and properly, where the judge
was alert to protect defendant's rights, and on occasion cautioned the prosecution and interjected questions to insure that
proper foundation was established for proffered evidence, and

[4] Admissibility of photograph of corpse in prosecution for
homicide or civil action for causing death, note, 73 A.L.R.2d 769.
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 226; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 785
et seq.
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where both instances of asserted tnisconduct were outside the
presence of the jury, in one of which, after the judge had
sustained a defense objection to evidence offered by the prosecution, he pointed out in what form the offered proof could
be admissible, and in the other of which defendant's CODlplaint went to a matter that resulted in a ruling favorable
to him.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Competency-Declarations and Admissions of
Defendant.-Statements obtained by interrogation practices
which are likely to exert such pressure on an individual as to
disable him from making a free and rational choice are inadmissible in 11 criminal prosecution.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers-Rules for
Determining Investigatory Conduct.-In a criminal case, the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming froDl custodial interrogation of defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incriminatiom!;
"custodial interrogation" is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
[9] Id.-lUghts of Accused-Aid of Counsel-When Right Attaches.-The "custodial" element of the accusatory stage when
the right to counsel attaches does not depend on ;the interrogator's subjective intent; custody occurs if the suspect is
physically deprived of his freedoDl of action in any significant
way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so
deprived.
[10] Id.-Determination of Punishment-Admissibility of Evidence.-At the penalty stage of a first degree murder trial, the
prosecution did not sustain its 'burdcn of showing that defendant's admission was not the product of custodial interrogation,
and his statement to a detective that' "I killed that broad"
should not have been received in evidence, where defendant
introduced evidence of his previous good reputation, behayior and record, and the People emphasized his callousness anll
lack of remorse in connection with a slaying as warranting the
death penalty; where, although no objective indicia of restraint or compulsion accompanied a sheriff's officer's request
that defendant go to the sheriff's station to make a statement
in connection with a homicide investigation, at the station
the officer learned of evidence against defendant ,focusing
suspicion on him; where the officer's first question elicited
defendant's damaging denial that a coat found at the homicide
scene was his, an apparent falsehood indicating that defendant felt something more than silence was expected and that
the pressures of the situation had disabled him from making a
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rational response; and where the next words of the officer were
understood by defendant in context as an accusatory statement that produced his admission of homicide.
[11] ld.-Determination of Punishment-Argument During Penalty Phase.-At the penalty phase of a first degree murder
trial, the People's closing argument erroneously invited the
jury to speculate, from properly admissible evidence that
defendant attempted to escape from custody on the day of his
arraignment, as to the possibility that in the future prison
officials might be ineffective in the discharge of their duties
and permit defendant to escape, where the jury were thereby
diverted from their duty and responsibility of selecting the
penalty.
[12] ld.-Determination of Punishment-Argument During Penalty Phase.-At the penalty phase of a first degree murder
trial, the selection of the penalty is for the jury alone, and
defendant is entitled to have them deliberate with that respon.sibility in mind; and the prosecuting attorney improperly
derogated their responsibility both as individual jurors and
collectively as a jury where, after correctly stating that the
court would inform the jurors that selection of penalty was a
matter of their independent individual determination and that
then the 12 jurors were to arrive at whatever penalty they
felt appropriate, he argued that "It is not the 12 of you alone.
It is everyone who has had connection with the case that will
have the consequences of the imposition of the maximum
penalty."
[13] ld.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Procedure for Determining
Penalty.-Under the rule that any substantial error occurring
.luring the penalty phase of a murder trial that results in the
death penalty must be deemed to have been prejudicial since
it reasonably may have swayed a juror, admission of defendant's illegally obtained statement, and error in tile prosecution's argument as to penalty, were prejudicial since the choice
of the penalty rested in the absolute discretion of the jury
and if only one of the 12 jurors was swayed by the inadmissihle eYidellce or error, then, in the absence of that evidence
or error, the death penalty might not have been imposed, and
what might have affected one juror might not have affected
others.

APPEAl., automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
!';ubd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of l~os
Angeles County. Mark Brandler, Judge. Reversed.

;!
~

I

:

[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminul Law, § 278 et seq; Am.Jur.2d,
Criminal Law, § 583.
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Prosecution for first degree murder. Judgment imposing
the death penalty reversed and cause remanded for retrial on
the issue of penalty only.
Charles M. Berg, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
and Luther Barrow for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas Kerrigan, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty of the
first d<'gree murder of Anne Ransom and fixed the penalty at
death. 'rhe court denied motions for a new trial and for
reduction of the penalty to life imprisonment. This appeal is
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
The prosecution presented the case to the jury on the
theory that the killing was murder of the first degree committed in the perpetration of burglary, robbery, and rape.
Mrs. Ransom was a waitress at the Big Time Bar in La
Puente. About 11 p.m. on April 20, 1966, the bar manager,
Mrs. McAndrew, left Mrs. Ransom in charge with the responsibility of closing the bar at 2 a.m. When Mrs. McAndrew
returned to the bar at 7 :45 the next morning she found Mrs.
Ransom, with a bloody wound in her head, lying naked on IlPr
.back on a pool table. The victim did not move or li>peak. Mrs.
McAndrew summoned sheriff's officers. Mrs. Ransom was
taken to a hospital, where she died on April 22. The cause of
death was a .22 caliber bullet that entered the middle of the
forehead and lodged at the back of the brain. On the right
side of her head was a very recent skull fracture that could
have resulted from a fall. Her genital area was not injured. A
teli>t for sperm was inconclusive because she was menstruating.
On the morning of April 21, articles of Mrs. Ransom's
clothing lay on the barroom fioor, a chair, and a table. A
man's coat was on a chair. In the coat were a label with the
name of a shop in Lafayette, Louisiana, and a tag with the
name "White." A .22 caliber shell casing was on the fioor.
Only 15 or 20 pennies were in the bar till. Mrs. Ransom 'Ii>
cash record showed that when she closed the bar she had $50
in currency and $15.50 in coins.
At 10 a.m. on April 21, Detective Sergeant Nichols and two
other officers of the sheriff's department went to the Royal
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Palms Apartments, three blocks from the Big Time Bar, and
talked with Dennis Seiler, a regular customer of the bar.
Seiler told the officers that he and defendant had been the last
customers to leave the bar the night before and that when
Mrs. Ransom. closed the door bellind them at 2 a.m., defendant
went toward the parking lot and Seiler walked home. Seiler
agreed to come to the sheriff's station and give a statement
and the officers left his apartment.
.
Defendant also lived at the Royal Palms. After interviewing Seiler, Sergeant Nichols and Sergeant Rowley went to
defendant's apartment. At that time these officers did not
know that Mrs. Ransom's wound was caused by a bullet or
that a .22 caliber shell casing bad been found in the bar or
that the man's coat found there contained labels with defendant's last name and the name I.Jafayette, Louisiana, a town
that defendant had left four or five weeks before. The only
information Nichols had about defendant was that given by
Seiler.
Sergeant Nichols knocked on the door of defendant's apartment and it swung open. Nichols called, "Sheriff's Office, is
anyone homeT" Defendant answered, "Just a minute," and
came to. the door in his bare feet and without a shirt. Nichols
displayed Ilis badge and said, "We're Sheriff's officers," and
defendant said, "Come on in." As Nichols walked through
the living room he saw a .22 caliber Beretta pistol in a holster.
He picked up the pistol and asked defendant if it was his.
Defendant replied that it was. 1 He was asked if he objected to
the officers' looking around the apartment and said, "No, go
ahead."
Nichols asked defendant what he had done the night before.
Defendant said he was "partying." Nichols asked if he had
been at the Big Time Bar, and defendant said he had not.
When asked what clothes he wore the night before, defendant
pointed out a suit and shirt on hangers, still clean. freshly
pressed, and apparently not worn. Nichols asked defendant
where he had been drinking, and defendant said that on
second thought he believed he llad stopped at the Big Time
Ba.r before going home. NiellOls said the. police "were trying
to determine wllat had happened the night before, we were
taking statements from everybody concerned," and asked
defendant if he would come to the sheriff's station and give a
statement. Defendant agreed and began dressing. Nichols
lLater tests showed that the fatal bullet was fired from defendant'.
pistol.
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-----------------

asked defendant where he slept, and defendant pointed to one
of twin beds. Nichols lifted the mattrt'ss and found a sock
with coins tied in it. Defendant said that the s:Jck was his,2
t hat he saved change, and tllat it contained about $15. As
defendant picked up his wallet Nichols saw tlwl it contained
a number of bills and asked how much money was in it.
Defendant said approximately $40.
At the station Sergeant Nichols left defendant in the squad
room while he talked with other officers for three or four
minutes. Nichols learned from his fellow officers that about
$50 in bills and $15.50 in coins had been taken from the bar
!lnd that the coat found there had the name "White" and a
Lafayette label in it. By this time Nichols knew that defendant was from Lafayette. He took the coat into the squad room
and asked defendant to try it on. Defendant did so, and. it
appeared to fit him.
Subsequently developed evidence showed a significant correspondence between the amount of money defendant had and
the amount taken from the bar. The sock eontained $16.67 in
coins (including only two pennies) and defendant had $87 in
currency (including about 25 one dollar bills) in his wallet
when he was booked. On the afternoon of April 20 he had
cashed his pay check of $44.10. From 5 p.m. until about 1 a.m.
he and Grant Dickson were in various bars drinking beer and
"looking for girls." About 1 a.m. defendant drove Dickson
home and then went to the Big Time Bar.
About 2 a.m. on April 21 a deputy &heriff on routine patrol
saw defendant outside the bar. Defendant said he was waiting
for a girl to close the bar.
Defendant's roommate visited defendant in jail about three
weeks after the killing. Defendant then said, "1 did it, but 1
don't know why. . . . [1] didn't need the money or anything. "
Defendant did not testify to the jury. Outside their presence he testified that he had not consented to the officers'
entry and search of his apartment on the morning of April 21.
The trial judge properly found on the basis of Sergeant
Nichols' contrary testimony that defendant freely consented
to the entry and search. (See People v. McLean, 56 Ca1.2d
660, 664 [16 Cal.Rptr. 347, 365 P.2d 403] j People v. Burke, 47
Cal.2d 45, 49 [301 P.2d 241].)
21n tact the sock was one of a pair that defendant '8 roommat'l had
taken off and left on the floor the previoua evenin".
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[1] Sprgeallt Nichols' testimony that at the sheriff's station defendant consented to tryon the coat found in the bar
and that the coat appeared to fit him was properly admitted.
The privilege against self-incrimination, with itf> attendant
requirement of the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726-727, 86 S:Ct.
1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], does not apply to the furnishing of
that kind of physical evidence. (See United Stales v: Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 222 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1154-1155; 87 S.Ct. 1926] ;
People v. Sudduth, 65 Ca1.2d 543, 546 [55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421
P.2d 401] ; People v. Ellis, 65 Ca1.2d 529, 534-535 [55 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393]; People v. Graves, 64 Ca1.2d 208, 210
[49 Cal.Rptr. 386, 411 P.2d 114].) [2] The trying on of
the coat was not a "critical stage" of the proceeding when
absence of counsel could derogate from the fairness of the
ensuing trial. (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 [18
L.Ed.2d 1178, 1183, 87 S.Ct. 1951] ; cf. United States v Wade,
supra, 388 U.S. 218, 227 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1157-1158].)
[3] Defendant contends that the evidence shows neither
burglary, robbery, nor rape or attempted rape and therefore is
insufficient to establish first degree murder. He emphasizes the
lack of testimony as to how he effected entrance to the bar
after Mr$. Ransom had closed it, as to whether he accomplished sexual penetration of the victim, and as to whetller any
specific monies found in his possession were coins or bills from
the bar. His argument in this regard virtuaJ1y ignores the
evidence snmmarized above. That evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination.
[4] It is asserted that the admission in evidence of a
photograph of deceased was pre·judicial error. The photograph
is a black-and-white depiction of the victim as Mrs. McAndrew found her on the morning of April 21. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by receiving it in evidence. (People v. Mathis, 63 Ca].2d 416,423 [46 Ca1.Rptr. 785, 406 P.2d
65] ; People v. Ha"rison, 59 Ca1.2d 622,627 [30 Cal.Rptr. 841,
381 P.2d 665] ; People v. Darling, 58 Ca1.2d 15, 21 [22 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 372 P.2d 316].)
[5]
Defendant contends that lIe was denied a fair trial
because two attorneys represented the People in the courtroom
whi1e defendant was represented by only olle deputy public
defender. Defendant cites no authority for this contention. He
states that ill court.s martial under the lTniform Code of Military Justice established practice requires that counsel for the
accused be equal to counsel for the prosecution in number and
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rank. He asks this court to enunciate a similar rule of practice
for criminal trials. The initial decision on the number of
attorneys assigned to defendant's defense was properly that
of the public defender. Had the deputy who represented
defendant felt inadequate to try the case because he was facing two attorneys or for any other reason, he could have
requested additional assistance from the office of the public
defender or could have explained his difficulties to the trial
judge and asked for the appointment of an associate. Nothing
in this record indicates that the task of defendant's lawyer
was in any way increased because of the presence of more
than one prosecuting attorney. In any case, lawyers differ
enormously from one another in their professional skills and
modus operandi. The court could not assure "equal" representation on both sides of a case by requiring numerical
equality of counsel. [6] It is further contended that the
trial judge abused his discretion by guiding and counselling
the two prosecuting attorneys througllOut the trial. The judge,
however, was alert to protect the riglJts of defendant. On
occasion he cautioned the prosecution and interjected questions of his own to insure that proper foundation was established for proffered evidence. The two instances of asserted
misconduct particularly referred to by defendant were outside
the presence of the jury. In one instance after the judge had
sustained a defense objection to evidence offered by the proscution, he pointed out in what form the offered proof could be
admissible. The other instance occurred during the trial of the
issue of guilt when the prosecution offered in evidence incriminating admissions made by defendant at the sheriff's station
after he tried on the coat. Defendant objected that receipt of
this evidence would violate Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384
U.S. 436, 467 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 719-720], because the admissions were made during custodial interrogation without the
required warnings as to his constitutional rights. After colloquy as to the legality of the offered evidence the judge
stated that unless the prosecution considered it vital to its
case" I can't understand or appreciate the logic or wisdom of
possibly asking that error be committed." The prosecution
then withdrew its offer of proof. Thus defendant's present
complaint goes to a matter that resulted in a ruling favorable
to him.
The judge's participation in the proceedings was evenhanded. The issue of guilt was tried fairly and properly.
At the penalty stage of the trial the prosecution renewed its
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offer of evidence of defendant's admissions, and the judge
overruled defendant's renewed objection. Sergeant Nichols
testified that on April 21 at the sheriff's station he showed
defendant the coat that was found in the bar and "I asked
him if it was his coat. He replied, 'No.' I asked him if he
would mind trying the coat on. He said, 'All right.' He stood
up. I handed him the coat, he put it on. He then took the coat
off and gave it back to me. I told him that the coat appeared
to fit him and, besides that, that I believed his last name was
written inside the coat. He hesitated for a while. He stated,
'It's my coat.' He said, 'I know I'm in trouble. I killed that
broad.' "8
[7] Statements obtained by " interrogation practices
which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as
to disable him from making a free and rational choice" are
inadmissible. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 464465 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 717-718].) [8] Thus "the prosecution
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." (384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p.
706].) [9] The "custodial" element of the accusatory
stage when the right to counsel attaches does not depend on
the interrogator's subjective intent; "custody occurs if the
suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person,
that he is so deprived." (People v. A,.nold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 448
3In the proceedings outside the jury's presence that resulted in the
judge's decision t.o admit these incriminating statements, Sergeant
Nichols testified that when defendant made the admissions Nichols at
once told him to be quiet, that it was the officer's duty to advise him of
his constitutional rights, and thn t he wns under arrest for suspicion of
robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. Officers then warned
clefendant that he had the right to counsel and to remain silent and that
his statements could be used ngainst him. 'fhese warnings met the require·
ments of Prople v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Ca1.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361].
Two months later Miranda v. An'zona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473 rlG
L.Ed.2d 694, 723], decided that a )l<'TNOIl heM for int.errogation must also
be told that. it he is indigent a lawyer will be nppoillt('d to represent him.
Because defenonnt was not. so ndvised the People at the trial (fo\1l'
months after the Miranda decision) did lIot seek to use statements and
real evidence obtained from him by sheriff's officers after they told him
he was under arrest.
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[58 Cal.Rptr. 115,426 P.2d 515] ; People v. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d
232,246 [57 Cal.Rptr. 363,424 P.2d 947].)
[10] No objective indicia of restraint or compulsion
accompanied Sergeant Nichols' request that defendant go to
the sheriff's station to make a statement. The ofticer .. told
him that we had talked to several people that were down
there, we were trying to determine what had happened the
night before, we were taking statements from everybody concerned, and would he give us a statement. He stated that he
would." At the station, however, the sergeant learned of evidence against defendant that, taken with what he had diseo\'ered at defendant's apartment, focused suspicion on defendant. 'l'he sergeant obviously and properly had no intention 01'
permitting defendant to leave without explaining that evidence. He testified that his purpose when he confronted
defendant with the coat was to give him an opportunity to
make a "reasonable explanation," not to elicit a confession.
His first question, however, elicited the damaging denial that
the coat was defendant's. This denial was not a reasonable
explanation; it was an apparent falsehood clearly indicating
that defendant felt that something more than silence was
expected of him and that the pressures of the situation had
disabled him from making a rational response. The next words
of the sergeant-"that the coat appeared to fit him and . . .
I believed his name was written inside "-could be alld were
. understood by defendant in context as an accusatory statement that produced an admission of homicide. The prosecution did not sustain its burden of showing that the admission
was not the product of custodial interrogation (People v.
Kelley, supra, 66 Ca1.2d 232, 246; People v. Arnold, supra, 66
Ca1.2d 438, 448) and the statements should not have been
received in evidence.
At the penalty stage of the trial defendant introduced testimony of family and associates as to his previous good reputation, behavior, and record. The People emphasized his apparent callousness and lack of remorse in connection with
Mrs. Ransom's slaying as warranting the death penalty. It
was to this stated end that the prosecution used defendallt's
unlawfully obtained admission that" I know I'm in trouble. I
killed that broad." [11] Also to this end and to show
that the prospect of defendant's rehabilitation was not good,
the People introduced evidence that defendant attempted to
escape from custody on the day of his arl'aignnwlIt by
exchanging clothes and identification with his cellmate. This
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evidence was properly received, but the People's closing argument erroneously invited the jury to speculate from that evidence as to the pussibility that in the future prison officials
lllight be ineffeetive in the discharge of their duties and perlllit defendant to escape:' Thus the jury were diverted from
their duty and responsibility of selecting the penalty in violation of the principle underlying our holding in People v.
Morse, 60 Ca1.2d 631, 643 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12
A.L.R.3d 810]. (In re Pike, 66 Ca1.2d 170, 172-173 [57 Cal.
Rptr.172,424 P.2d 724].)
[12] The prosecuting attorney in arguing as to selection
of penalty correctly stated that "The Court is going to
infonn you that this is a matter of your independent individual determination. And then the 12 of you arrive at whatever penalty you feel appropriate." Then, however, he proceeded improperly to derogate their responsibility both as
individual jurors and collectively as a jury by arguing, "It is
not the 12 of you alone. It is everyone who has had connection
with the case;that will have the consequences of the imposition
of the max~um penalty."5 Of course the death sentence is
imposed by 1jhe judge and carried out by the administrative
official charged with that duty, but the selection of the penalty is for the jury alone and the defendant is entitled to have
them deliberate with that responsibility in mind.
4Tbe proseeuting attorney argued, "if you think that Mr. White is
remorsefUl-why, sure he is, folks, that is why he tried to escape from
t.be County Jail and get out of this state. That is why. He has demonstrated that he will take the first oJlportunity that is available to him and
IIC will try to get out of custody. He will not take his medie-ine. He will
lIOt take punishment. He will do anything he can to avoid it.
"And, ladies and gentlemen, what would he be like after an escape'
More destitute, more desperate than he was at these times."
Defense counsel promptly objeeted and the trial judge admonished the
jury to disregard the last comment.
u'l'bc illeollsistent argument as to tlds matter ill its entirety was, "The
Court is going to inform you that tbis is a matter of your independent,
individual determination. And then the 12 of you arrive at whatever
penalty you feel appropriate.
"And AS you do that, you must never think in terms of, 'I, Juror
No. ii, or Juror No.6, 7, 8,' whatever the number might be, 'am the one
who is doing this, who is imposing the maximum punishment.'
"You are, in effect, an adjunct of the administration of justice of the
State of California. It is not the 12 of you alone. It is everyone who has
had connection with the ease t.llat will have the consequences of the
imposition of the maximum penalty, not just the 12 of you.
"So, as you reflect upon your individual l'ole in t.his, one of you must
not think that, 'I am doing this all by royself. I am considering all of
the evidenee, all tbe law applicable, and I am deciding whether the crime
is so grave, so monstrous, so serious, 80 lacking in mitigation, that I
feel that this punisllment is appropriate.' I would suggest that is not
the function you should perform."
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------[13] The People contend that if there was error in the
admission of defendant's illegally obtained statement there
was no prejudice in light of the other evidence of defpIHlallt's
want of remorse, and that any error in the proseeution's
argument as to penalty is not prejudicial in light of the
court's correct instructions. The choice of penalty, however,
rests in the absolute discretion of the jury and" If only one
of the twelve jurors was swayed by the inadmissible evidence
or error, then, in the absence of that evidence or error, the
death penalty would not have been imposed. What may affect
one juror might not affect another. The facts that the evidence
of guilt is overwhelming, as here, or that the crime involved
was, as here, particularly revolting, are not controlling. 'I'his
being so it necessarily follows that any substantial error
occurring during the penalty phase of the trial, that results in
the death penalty, since it reasonably may have swayed a
juror, must be deemed to have been prejudicial." (People v.
Hamilton, 60 Cal.2d 105,137 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4,383 P.2d 412].)
The judgment imposing the death penalty is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for retrial on the'issue of penalty only
and for the pronouncement of a new sentence and judgment
as provided by law.

Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I dissentfrom reversal of the penalty.
TIle majority apply impractically rigid evidentiary standards to a proceeding designed not to ascertain guilt, but to
assess penalty. In so doing, they overlook the basic purpose of
the penalty proceeding, which is to receive evidl'nce "of the
circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's
background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty." (Pen. Code, § 190.1.)
I am well aware of the rule that "any substantial error
occurring during the penalty phase of the trial, that results ill
the death penalty, since it reasonably may have swayed a
juror, must be deemed to have been prejudicial." (Italics
added.) (People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 105, 137 [32
Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412].)
In the context in which defendant's statement was used,
tllere is certainly no substantial error, and I doubt that there
is any error whatever. When defendant was asked to tryon a
coat-a procedure the majority finds unobjectionable-he
admitted the garment was his, and then without further

II

r

I
V. WHITE
[69 C.2d
---------- --------interrogation voluntarily added, ,. I know I'm in trouble. 1
killed that broad." Sergl'llllt Nichols imll1ediatt·\y cautioned
defendant in a manner the majority finds satisfied the
requirements of People v. DOI'ado (H)65) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42
Ca1.Rptr.169,.398 P.2d 361].
'fhe unsolicited statement of defendant was clearly admissible. As this court said, unanimously, in People v. Cotter
(1965) 63 CaI.2d 386, 396 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862] :
"Neither this court, nor the United States Supreme Court,
has ever taken the position that the desire of a guilty man to
confess his crime should be stifled, impeded, discouraged, or
hindered in any way."
Assuming arguendo that the statement was inadmissible, it
strains credulity to find prejudicial error in its use in the
penalty phase of the trial. Defendant said "1'm in trouble.' I
This conceded nothing 110t then evident. "I killed that
broad. I I This was introduced after the jury had already
found he llad in fllct kiHr.d the waitl'(>ss. It added no new
element. Only applying the term "broad" to the victim
migllt be deemed questionable. Yet that eipression is not considered to be criminal argot; it is common language of the
street, not pejorative but merely inoffensive slang. (See H. L.
Mencken~ The American Language, 4th ed. (1938) p. 577. 1 )
If that is the manner in which defendant spoke, or r~gularly
speaks, then that is the way in which the jury must accept
him and his utterances in weighing "aggravation or mitigation" of the totality of circumstances. In t11e truth-seeking
process there is no justification to conceal that knowledge,
whether significant or trivial, from the jury.
Whether the statement in question reflects callousness or
laek of remorse is subject to interpretation. But it is not
inadmissible, for the jury is entitled to consider defendant's
subjective response to the brutal act he committed. Toward
that end, the defense produced a witness whom defendant told
"he was sorry he did it." The jurors Who have the grave
responsibility of assessing penalty may weigh all of the
defendant's virtues and vices. Remorse, being the echo of a
lost virtue, is one of the elements properly considered.
I find no reversible error in the prosecuting attclTlwy'lI
argument to the jury. Defendant's attempt to escape from the
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IMencken places broad for woman in the same category as law for
policeman, big-house for prison, croaker for doctor, bone-orcllard for
cemetery, eye for detective, liard-stuff for metal money, paper-hanger for
for~er.
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county jail was his voluntary act. From that established circumstance flows a perfectly rational deduction that defendant
was, and in the future might be, a difficult rather than contrite prisoner.
The prosecutor's discussion regarding individual responsibility of the jurors may have been "inconsistent" as the
majority's footnote 5 suggests. There is a giant stf.'P between
inconsistency-which ordinarily redolwds to the advantage of
the defense-and prejudicial error. Any confusion rf.'garding
the function of the jurors, individually and collectively, was
adequately dissolved by the court in its instructions. It is
evident that the jurors were not confused and that they followed the court's instructions, for after returning their verdict they were polled and each juror responded individuany
that the verdict was his. .
.
I would affinn the judgment in its entirety.
McComb, J., and Burke, J.,concurred.
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